California Appeals Court Rules that Defending Insurer Is Not Bound by Stipulated Judgment to Which It Did Not Consent

By and on September 18, 2015
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In 21st Century Insurance Company v. Superior Court (Tapia), a California appeals court held that an insurance company that is defending its insured cannot be bound by a stipulated judgment entered into by its insured without a trial and judgment after verdict.

The insured, Cy Tapia, was a teenager living with his aunt and grandmother. Tapia was driving with Cory Driscoll in a vehicle owned by Tapia’s grandfather when he was involved in an accident that left Driscoll severely injured. Tapia had $100,000 in liability coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant 21st Century Insurance Company.

Driscoll and his mother sued Tapia. 21st Century agreed to provide a defense to this suit. Plaintiffs rejected 21st Century’s settlement offer of the $100,000 policy limit as they believed that Tapia might be covered under 21st Century policies issued to Tapia’s aunt and grandmother, each providing $25,000 in coverage.

21st Century offered $150,000 to settle the case against Tapia which plaintiffs declined as they demanded $3 million for Driscoll and $1.15 million for his mother. 21st Century warned Tapia that it would not agree to be bound if Tapia accepted the offer. Tapia ignored this warning, agreed to the entry of a stipulated judgment and assigned any rights he had against 21st Century. Plaintiffs filed a bad faith action against 21st Century, and 21st Century moved for summary judgment which was denied. This denial was reversed on appeal.

The Court of Appeal cited Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 730 for the rule that “a defending insurer cannot be bound be a settlement made without its participation and without any actual commitment on its insured’s part to pay the judgment.” The crucial element in the Hamilton ruling was the lack of a judgment rendered after an adversarial trial given the potential for collusion. The Court stated that if the situation involved an insurer that refused to defend, then the insured was free to enter into a stipulated judgment at any time.

The Court of Appeal rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that 21st Century breached its duty to defend because it did not acknowledge coverage or a duty to defend under the policies issued to Tapia’s aunt and grandmother.  The Court also found that the undisputed evidence demonstrated that 21st Century did not have a duty to defend Tapia under either of the policies issued to his aunt or grandmother.

Filed under Bad Faith, Duty to Defend

East Versus West: Washington Federal District Courts Offer Differing Views on IFCA Claims

By and on August 3, 2015
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The Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”) is generating some interesting divisions in the Washington Federal District Courts. As previously reported, Judge Marsha J. Pechman recently ruled in May, 2015 that an IFCA cause of action is only available to insureds under first party insurance policies, but not third party liability policies. This post discusses how cases brought under the IFCA are being examined differently between the Eastern and Western Federal District Courts of Washington.

As a brief background, IFCA (RCW 48.30.015) states, in part, as follows:

(1) Any first party claimant to a policy of insurance who is unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer may bring an action in the superior court of this state to recover the actual damages sustained, together with the costs of the action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, as set forth in subsection (3) of this section.

(2) The superior court may, after finding that an insurer has acted unreasonably in denying a claim for coverage or payment of benefits or has violated a rule in subsection (5) of this section, increase the total award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages.

(3) The superior court shall, after a finding of unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, or after a finding of a violation of a rule in subsection (5) of this section, award reasonable attorneys’ fees and actual and statutory litigation costs, including expert witness fees, to the first party claimant of an insurance contract who is the prevailing party in such an action.

…

(5) A violation of any of the following is a violation for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3) of this section:

(a) WAC 284-30-330, captioned “specific unfair claims settlement practices defined”;

(b) WAC 284-30-350, captioned “misrepresentation of policy provisions”;

(c) WAC 284-30-360, captioned “failure to acknowledge pertinent communications”;

(d) WAC 284-30-370, captioned “standards for prompt investigation of claims”;

(e) WAC 284-30-380, captioned “standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements applicable to all insurers”; or

(f) An unfair claims settlement practice rule adopted under RCW 48.30.010 by the insurance commissioner intending to implement this section. The rule must be codified in chapter 284-30 of the Washington Administrative Code.

The Western Federal District Courts have held that an IFCA cause of action is only available if the insured shows that the insurer unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or that the insurer unreasonably denied payment of benefits, but not if the insurer only violated the Washington Administrative Code (“WAC”) provisions. Lease Crutcher Lewis WA, LLC v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110866 (W.D. Wash. October 15, 2010); Weinstein & Riley, P.S. v. Westport Ins. Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26369 (W.D. Wash. March 14, 2011); Phinney v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22328 (W.D. Wash. February 22, 2012); Cardenas v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145194 (W.D. Wash. December 16, 2011).

However, the Eastern Federal District Courts have rejected the precedent set by the Western Federal District Courts and have held that a violation of the enumerated WAC provisions is an independent basis for a cause of action, regardless of coverage or benefits. Merrill v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp.3d 1137 (E.D. Wash. 2014); Hell Yeah Cycles v. Ohio Sec. Ins. Co., 16 F. Supp.3d 1224 (E.D. Wash. 2014); Hover v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119162 (E.D. Wash. September 12, 2014).

In Langley v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26079 (E.D. Wash. February 24, 2015), the Court noted that it is “not persuaded that an IFCA cause of action requires a denial of coverage or benefit… The opinions [from the Western District] do not provide any analysis of the statutory construction they utilized to reach their conclusions, and appear to only be looking for express causes of action without determining whether the IFCA creates an implied cause of action for violation of an enumerated WAC.” The Court in Langley then continued by reviewing the elements for an implied cause of action, i.e. whether the plaintiff is “within the class for whose ‘especial’ benefit the statute was enacted”; whether “legislative intent, explicitly or implicitly, supports creating or denying a remedy”; and “whether implying a remedy is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation.” The Court determined that the plaintiff, as first party claimant under an insurance policy, was within the class of those that the legislature sought to protect; that the legislative intent was to create a claim for violating the enumerated WACs in both the language in the statute and the explanation of that language provided to the voters; and that implying a remedy is consistent with the IFCA’s purpose. As a result, the Court concluded that “at a minimum, an independent implied cause of action exists under the IFCA for a first party claimant to bring a suit for a violation of the enumerated WAC provisions.” The Court rejected “the progeny of cases from the Western District of Washington which reached a different conclusion.”

In light of the inconsistencies in the Washington Federal District Courts, it is important for insurers to understand the jurisdictional differences when evaluating an IFCA claim. In addition, insurers should be particularly sensitive to efforts by policyholders to establish jurisdiction in the more favorable Eastern Federal District Courts.

Filed under Bad Faith, Commercial General Liability, Unfair Insurance Practices

Pennsylvania High Court Allows Policyholder to Recover Voluntary Settlements Paid without Insurer Consent Even Absent Insurer Bad Faith

By on July 28, 2015
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On July 21, 2015 a sharply divided (and short-handed) Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled 3-2 that an insurer defending an insured subject to a reservation of rights may be required to reimburse its insured for any “fair and reasonable” settlement its insured enters into even when the insurer does not consent to the settlement, and even where the insurer has not acted in bad faith. Babcock & Wilcox Co., et al. v. American Nuclear Insurers, et al., 2015 Pa. LEXIS 1551, No. 2 WAP 2014. The Court, however, did not give carte blanche to insureds to settle without insurer consent. Instead, the Court held that such a right is “limited to those cases where an insured accepts a settlement offer after an insurer breaches its duty by refusing the fair and reasonable settlement while maintaining its reservation of rights and, thus, subjects an insured to potential responsibility for the judgment in a case where the policy is ultimately deemed to cover the relevant claims.” In other words, the Court held that an insurer defending under a reservation of rights either must (1) consent to and pay a fair and reasonable settlement offer presented to its insured, (2) withdraw any reservation of rights, or (3) risk having to reimburse its insured who settles without consent if the claim is found to have been covered under the policy. As the dissent emphasized, the Court’s ruling represents a substantial abrogation of the contractual rights of insurers under Pennsylvania law, which previously permitted policyholders to circumvent the “voluntary payments” provisions of typical liability policies only where their insurers were guilty of having acted in bad faith conduct in failing to settle the underlying claim.

Babcock & Wilcox (“B&W”), along with ARCO, had been sued in a long-running class action involving over 500 plaintiffs claiming bodily injury and property damage from alleged emissions from the defendants’ nuclear faculties. B&W’s insurer, ANI, had provided an aggressive defense, subject to a reservation of rights, expending more than $40 million over the course of two decades, pursuant to a policy with $320 million in limits (which were eroded by defense costs). The policy contained a standard consent to settlement/cooperation clause that provided, inter alia, that “[t]he insured shall not, except at his own cost, make any payments, assume any obligations or incur any expense.”

Believing that there was a strong likelihood of a obtaining a complete defense judgment, and seeking to discourage potential “copycat” claims, ANI rejected all settlement offers presented. B&W, which for some time had been pressuring ANI to settle, entered into an $80 million settlement (well within the $280 million remaining policy limits) without ANI’s consent. B&W then sued ANI in state court for reimbursement of the settlement amount.

In the trial court, ANI contended that it had no obligation to reimburse Babcock & Wilcox because B&W breached the policy’s consent to settle requirement. Relying upon Cowden v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 134 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1957) (holding that “an insurer must pay a judgment in excess of policy limits for its bad faith failure to settle below policy limits”), ANI argued that, under Pennsylvania law, an insurer could only be required to reimburse its insured for a settlement reached without its consent if the insurer acted in bad faith in refusing to settle. By contrast, B&W, framing the argument as one of first impression in Pennsylvania, and relying on case authority from other states, argued that an insurer is obligated to reimburse its insured for any fair and reasonable settlement entered into in good faith, regardless of a cooperation clause.

The trial court eventually held that “an insurer, defending subject to a reservation of rights, is required to reimburse an insured for a settlement reached in violation of the consent to settle clause where coverage is found to exist and the settlement is ‘fair and reasonable’ and made in ‘good faith and without collusion.’” Applying this standard, a jury found that the settlement reached between B&W and the underlying plaintiffs was reasonable and, accordingly, ANI was obliged to reimburse B&W.

ANI appealed and the Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed and adopted Florida’s “insured’s choice” test where an insured can either: 1) accept a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights and be bound by a consent to settlement provision provided that the insurer does not act in bad faith; or 2) reject a defense pursuant to a reservation of rights and, if coverage is found, hold the insurer liable for defenses costs and the costs of any reasonable settlement.

The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Superior Court’s decision, holding that the “insured’s choice” test is irreconcilable with Pennsylvania law because an insured’s rejection of a defense under a reservation of rights relieves an insurer of its coverage obligation. Further, the Court criticized the “insured’s choice” as being largely illusory because many, if not most, insureds lack resources to fund an adequate defense. The Justices, however, diverged sharply as to what the applicable test should be for “determining whether an insurer is liable under its insurance policy for a settlement made by its insured without securing the insurer’s consent, when the insurer is defending the claim subject to a reservation of rights.” After reviewing the policy arguments proffered by the parties and their amici, and examining how courts in other jurisdictions have approached the issue, the Court held that “where an insurer defends subject to a reservation of rights and breaches its duty to settle . . . an insured may accept a settlement over the insurer’s refusal where the settlement is fair, reasonable, and non-collusive.” The Court’s holding was limited to situations when an insurer is defending under a reservation of rights and – because of the nature of the particular reservation of rights – its interests diverge from those of its insured. In such a situation, the “determination of whether the settlement is fair and reasonable necessarily entails consideration of the terms of the settlement, the strength of the insured’s defense against the asserted claims, and whether there is any evidence of fraud or collusion on the part of the insured.” Here, the Court held that its new standard had been satisfied and reinstated the trial court’s judgment requiring ANI to reimburse B&W for the $80 million settlement.

In dissent, Justice Eakin, joined by Chief Justice Saylor, vociferously criticized the majority’s adoption of the “fair and reasonable” standard.  In the dissenting Justices’ view, this was not a case of first impression at all. Rather, the dissenters insisted that the outcome of the case clearly was governed by the holding of Cowden, imposing liability for an excess verdict where the insurer’s failure to settle within policy limits was in bad faith. In the dissenters’ view, so long as ANI’s decision to continue defending rather than settling the underlying litigation was made in good faith, ANI was within its right to do so. The dissenting Justices criticized the new standard adopted by the Majority:

[The “fair and reasonable” standard] allows an insured to breach the contract’s requirement that the insurer must consent to any settlement when the insured anticipates an excess future verdict and, as a practical matter, permits the insured to determine for itself (in the first instance) that the insurer acted unreasonably in refusing to settle.

The majority repeatedly emphasized that not all reservations of rights are created equal, and that whether an insurers’ refusal to settle or give up its reservation of rights constitutes a policy breach must be examined on a case-by-case basis. The Court also admonished that settlements be closely vetted to ensure that they are in fact reasonable under the circumstances and non-collusive. Despite these cautionary notes, policyholders will doubtless argue that this decision gives them a broad license to settle over insurer objection, ultimately with an insurer’s money, whenever an insurer is defending subject to a reservation of rights that might defeat or limit coverage. Moreover, this decision, together with the Court’s ruling in December 2014 in Allstate Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 90 A.3d 699 (Pa. 2014), that statutory insurance bad faith claims are assignable, threaten to seriously undermine the insurer’s bargained-for rights to control the defense and settlement of claims against their policyholders.

Filed under Bad Faith, Commercial General Liability, Consent to Settle/Unreasonable Settlements, Duty to Cooperate, Duty to Defend, Reservation of Rights

Third Circuit Holds That Punitive Damages Award Against the Insured is Not Recoverable in Subsequent Bad Faith Action

By and on June 22, 2015
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In Wolfe v. Allstate Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 12-4450, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9876, (3d Cir. June 12, 2015), the Third Circuit, interpreting Pennsylvania law, held that punitive damages awarded against an insured in a personal injury suit may not be recovered in a later breach of contract or bad faith suit against the insurer. We covered the Wolfe case back in December when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the insured could assign statutory bad faith claims to the underlying plaintiff.

In the underlying suit, Allstate’s insured rear-ended the plaintiff while under the influence of alcohol. The insured’s policy provided liability coverage up to $50,000, and required Allstate to defend suits by third parties arising out of automobile accidents, but provided that Allstate “would ‘not defend an insured person sued for damages which are not covered by this policy.’” Id. at *2. Plaintiff made an initial settlement demand to Allstate of $25,000, based on medical records provided to Allstate’s adjuster. Allstate provided Plaintiff with a counteroffer of $1,200, which plaintiff rejected. After the plaintiff filed suit, Allstate warned the insured that if the damages at trial exceeded his $50,000 policy limit, the insured would be personally responsible for the excess portion of the award. During the course of the litigation, Plaintiff learned of the insured’s intoxication and amended his complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. Allstate informed the insured about the potential for punitive damages, and reminded him “that those damages were not covered under his policy,” and that “Allstate would not pay that portion of [any] verdict, and he would be held responsible for it.” Id. at *3. Throughout the course of litigation, neither party moved from its initial offer or demand, and the case advanced to trial. At trial, the jury awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages. Allstate paid the compensatory damage award, but not the punitive damage award. In return for plaintiff’s agreement not to enforce the punitive damages judgment against him personally, the insured assigned his rights against Allstate to plaintiff.

Prior to trial in the subsequent bad faith action, Allstate filed a motion in limine seeking to bar evidence of the punitive damages award in the underlying trial as damages in the bad faith suit, as Pennsylvania law prohibits an insurer from paying a punitive damages award. The District Court denied the motion, but the Third Circuit reversed, predicting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would conclude “in an action by an insured against his insurer for bad faith, the insured may not collect as compensatory damages the punitive damages awarded against it in the underlying lawsuit.” Id. at *10. Thus, the District Court erred in denying Allstate’s motion in limine to preclude such evidence from being presented to the jury. Furthermore, based on this finding, the Third Circuit held “an insurer has no duty to consider the potential for the jury to return a verdict for punitive damages when it is negotiating a settlement of the case.” Id. at *21. Imposing such a duty, the Third Court held, would be tantamount to making the insurer responsible for punitive damages, which are not insurable under Pennsylvania public policy. Based on these holdings, the Third Circuit granted Allstate a new trial on the bad faith claims, where plaintiff was barred from presenting evidence relating to the $50,000 in punitive damages, but was allowed to seek compensatory damages based on any injuries other than the punitive damages award.

Allstate also filed a motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract and bad faith claims prior to trial. Allstate argued that once the punitive damages award was removed from the plaintiff’s damages claim, the case should be dismissed because the underlying compensatory damage award was within policy limits and therefore the insured suffered no harm. The District Court denied the motion in its entirety. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial, first noting that an insurer “can still be liable for nominal damages for violating its contractual duty of good faith by failing to settle.” Id. at *25. Secondly, the Third Circuit upheld the District Court’s denial of summary judgment on the statutory bad faith claim, as the statute makes no requirement that the plaintiff be entitled to damages for the insurer’s bad faith to bring such a claim. This holding reflects the policy behind the statute, which is intended to deter insurance companies from engaging in bad faith practices, not compensate injured insureds. Thus, an insured “does not need compensatory damages to succeed on his statutory bad faith claim, which only permits recovery of punitive damages, interest, and costs.” Id. at *28.

The Wolfe decision is particularly notable for its holding that (1) an insured cannot recover an underlying punitive damages award in a subsequent bad faith claim, and (2) an insurer is not necessarily obligated to consider the potential for punitive damages exposure in the underlying case when evaluating a claim for settlement. It remains to be seen whether a Pennsylvania state court would agree with the Third Circuit’s determination. In addition, Wolfe may have limited application going forward depending on the facts and circumstances of future cases.

Filed under Auto, Bad Faith, Punitive Damages

Federal District Court Rejects Insureds’ $40 Million Bad Faith Claim

By and on June 9, 2015
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In Kollman v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 1:04-cv-3106-PA, Judge Owen Panner of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon recently ruled as a matter of law that even though National Union incorrectly denied coverage to its insureds, National Union did not act in bad faith in refusing to defend the underlying case. Therefore, the Court found that National Union was not liable for a $40 million judgment against the insureds.

The coverage litigation stemmed from a lawsuit filed in 2002 by Daryl Kollman against National Union’s insureds. The insureds tendered Kollman’s claims under an Executive and Organization Liability Policy. National Union denied coverage, relying primarily upon the “insured-versus-insured” exclusion, which excluded coverage for claims brought by an insured against another insured. Kollman was a former director of the insured’s subsidiary, and National Union stated that coverage for his claim was excluded. National Union declined to participate in the defense of the insureds and did not attempt to settle the matter within the $5 million policy limits.

The state court trial resulted in a $40 million judgment against the insureds. The insureds sued National Union, alleging they were entitled to coverage and that National Union acted in bad faith by unreasonably denying coverage and by failing to settle with Kollman for policy limits when it purportedly had the opportunity to do so. The insureds sought to hold National liable for the $40 million judgment, plus attorney fees and costs.

On summary judgment, the Court concluded that National Union had incorrectly denied coverage based on the policy’s insured-versus-insured exclusion, and it therefore had a duty to defend. However, the Court granted National Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the bad faith claims. Relying upon Georgetown Realty v. Home Ins. Co., 313 Or. 97, 831 P.2d 7 (1992), the Court ruled that Oregon law did not permit a bad faith failure-to-settle claim against an insurer that did not assume the duty to defend in the first instance. The Court also ruled that even though National Union was incorrect in its coverage determination with respect to the insured-versus-insured exclusion, its coverage decision was reasonable. The Court therefore dismissed all bad faith claims.

Filed under Bad Faith, Exclusion, Executive and Organization Liability Policy

Denial of Summary Judgment Does Not Automatically Establish Duty To Defend

By and on February 10, 2015
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In McMillin Companies, LLC v. American Safety Indemnity Company, a California appeals court found a trial court erred in finding the denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend meant the insurer’s duty to defend was established as a matter of law.

McMillin Companies, LLC was the general contractor for a series of residential construction projects in Temecula, California.  After the projects were completed, McMillin was named in a construction defect lawsuit that arose out of the projects.  McMillin tendered its defense to the insurers of allegedly implicated subcontractors, including American Safety Indemnity Company (“ASIC”), contending it was an additional insured.  None of the insurers accepted McMillin’s tender.

McMillin sued ASIC and other insurers for breach of contract and bad faith based on their alleged failure to defend.  After numerous settlements, ASIC was left as the sole remaining defendant.  ASIC submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that it did not owe any duty to defend because its policy only covered  liability arising out of its named insured’s “ongoing operations” which had ceased prior to the occurrences alleged in the litigation.  This motion was denied on the basis ASIC had not met its initial burden of proof to show no triable issue of material fact.

At trial, McMillin moved in limine to exclude argument disputing ASIC’s duty to defend, and ASIC moved in limine to preclude McMillin from arguing the amounts it had received from the other insurers in settlement were not offsets to McMillin’s alleged damages against ASIC.  The trial court granted McMillin’s motion, finding the prior denial of ASIC’s motion for summary judgment demonstrated the existence of a disputed issue of material fact which necessitated a finding of a duty to defend.  The trial court also granted, without explanation, ASIC’s motion as to the settlement offsets.

The California court of appeal reversed, holding the trial court erred in granting the motions in limine.  Disagreeing with the trial court’s conclusion, the appeals court reasoned that the denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment because it failed to meet its initial burden of proof was not the same as denying the motion based on an unresolved factual dispute.  The appeals court also concluded McMillin’s settlements with the other insurers were not potential offsets to damages but rather would only affect McMillin’s right to recover any damages awarded at trial.

Filed under Bad Faith, Duty to Defend

Cedell v. Farmers – Where Are We Now?

By , and on January 27, 2015
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In Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Company of Washington, 176 Wn.2d 686 (2013), the Washington Supreme Court significantly restricted an insurer’s ability to assert the attorney-client privilege over communications with counsel by ruling that there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege in first-party bad faith claims handling lawsuits.  The insurer may, however, overcome the presumption by showing that its attorney was “not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating or processing the claim, but instead in providing the insurer with counsel as to its own potential liability; for example, whether or not coverage exists under the law.”

As one Washington federal district court noted, while it is difficult to assess when a particular communication involves an attorney performing quasi-fiduciary duties, “as a general matter, there will likely be no privilege for a lawyer investigating facts to reach a coverage decision, but there likely will be a privilege for a lawyer giving an insurer strictly legal advice about potential liability that could result from a coverage decision or some other course of action.”  Anderson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112360 (W.D. Wash. August 13, 2014).  However, the attorney-client privilege can still be overcome if the insured asserts that the insurer engaged “in an act of bad faith tantamount to civil fraud” and makes a showing that “a reasonable person would have a reasonable belief that an act of bad faith has occurred” or that an insurer engaged in a “bad faith attempt to defeat a meritorious claim.”  Such analysis would, however, require something more than an honest disagreement between the insured and the insurer about coverage under the policy. For a prior G&R Insurance Bulletin on Cedell, click here.

Unfortunately, the Cedell Court caused some confusion regarding the process through which an insurer can overcome the presumption.  In short, it is unclear if there is a two-step process which requires the insurer to show that its attorney was not performing quasi-fiduciary (investigating and evaluating or processing the claim), followed by an in camera review of the allegedly privileged documents, or if the in camera review is part of the initial showing.  As one federal district court noted, “the opinion creates rather than alleviates confusion about what must be produced, and under what circumstances.”  Phil. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Olympia Early Learning Center, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93067, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 2, 2013).  There has been no Washington state court decision that explains the process identified in Cedell, but recent Washington federal district court decisions applying Cedell may shed some light on this confusion, at least in federal court practice. MKB Constructors v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78883 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2014)

In MKB Constructors, Judge James L. Robart held that because state substantive law applies to the attorney-client privilege, an insurer must demonstrate that the attorney was not engaged in the “quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating or processing” a claim under Cedell.  However, federal law applies to the manner in which the court determines the existence of the privilege because the process through which an insurer can overcome the presumption is procedural in nature.  As a result, the court may use its discretion and utilize mechanisms other than an in camera review, i.e. privilege log, affidavit, declaration, to determine the applicability of Cedell in the specific context of the case.  Even so, most of the federal court decisions since MKB Constructors utilized in camera review to assess whether the insurer’s counsel engaged in quasi-fiduciary tasks.  See MKB Constructors v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102759 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2014); Anderson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112360 (W.D. Wash. August 13, 2014); Johnson v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121342 (W.D. Wash. August 29, 2014); Collazo v. Balboa Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109336 (W.D. Wash. August 7, 2014); Palmer v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103079 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2013).

Another important aspect of the MKB Constructors decision is the holding by Judge Robart that Cedell is inapplicable in federal court when the work-product doctrine is invoked.  The work product doctrine is governed by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(3); thus, Cedell is inapplicable when an insurer withholds documents under the work product doctrine in federal court.  It is important to keep in mind, however, that in the Ninth Circuit, a document is eligible for work product protection only if the document was prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.  In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Mark Torf), 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004).  If a document would have been created in substantially similar form in the normal course of business, however, the fact that litigation is afoot will not protect it from discovery.  Id. at 908.  Under this analysis, Washington federal courts have held that draft denial letters prepared by the insurer’s coverage counsel are discoverable.  See Anderson v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118400 (W.D. Wash. August 25, 2014); Tilden-Coil Constructors, Inc. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106369 (W.D. Wash. September 23, 2010).

Finally, as predicted, the federal district court in Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Omeros Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53225 (W.D. Wash. April 12, 2013), rejected the insurer’s argument that Cedell only applies to first-party claims, not to third-party liability claims.  The federal district court reasoned that the Cedell court based its ruling on the quasi-fiduciary duty of an insurer to its insured, which exists in both first-party and third-party claims.  Id. at *6-7.

Cedell is still very much alive and well in Washington and insurers should continue to pay close attention to how it impacts reliance on the attorney-client privilege in discovery in both first and third-party bad faith litigation.

Filed under Attorney-Client Privilege, Bad Faith

Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act Only Applies to First-Party Claims

By , and on January 20, 2015
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Ever since the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”) took effect on December 6, 2007, insureds have asserted a claim for IFCA violation in lawsuits against an insurance company.  While IFCA specifies that “[a]ny first party claimant to a policy of insurance who is unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer may bring an action,” insureds under both first-party policies and third-party liability policies have asserted IFCA claims in light of Washington courts’ very pro-policyholder attitude.  An IFCA claim is very attractive to the insureds because if a court finds that an insurer acted unreasonably in denying a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, an insured is entitled to actual damages (not limited to the benefits that were unreasonably denied), treble of those damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.

Earlier this year, however, Judge Marsha Pechman dismissed plaintiffs’ IFCA claim against Continental Casualty Company (Continental), ruling that IFCA does not apply to third-party liability claims.  Cox v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68081 (W.D. Wash. May 15, 2014). Judge Pechman explained that only a “first party claimant to a policy of insurance” has a right of action under IFCA.

Cox arises out of a malpractice action against retired dentist, Dr. Henri Duyzend.  In the malpractice action, a group of Dr. Duyzend’s former patients secured a judgment totaling $35,212,000 against Dr. Duyzend for their malpractice claims.  Thereafter, on an assignment of claims from Dr. Duyzend, the dental patients sued Continental, alleging in part that Continental acted in bad faith and violated the IFCA by not pursing a global settlement with them and risking an excess judgment against Dr. Duyzend.  Continental had issued a professional liability policy to Dr. Duyzend.

With regard to the plaintiffs’ IFCA claim, Judge Pechman explained that “[a]n IFCA claim arises when ‘any first party claimant’ to a policy of insurance … is unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer.”  Judge Pechman noted that a third-party insurance policy “indemnif[ies] an insured for covered claims which others [third-party claimants] file against him.”  The professional liability policy at issue in Cox was a third-party liability policy, not a first-party insurance policy.  As a result, Dr. Duyzend was never a first-party claimant under the IFCA and could not assign an IFCA claim to the plaintiffs.  Therefore, Judge Pechman dismissed the plaintiffs’ IFCA claim.

In one subsequent case, Judge Pechman held consistently with her decision in Cox.  Judge Pechman denied a plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to assert an IFCA violation against an insurer under a third-party liability policy, holding that such claims are not permitted under the rule.  Judge Pechman refused to certify to the Washington Supreme Court the question of whether an insured under a third-party liability policy may have an IFCA claim.  In so holding, the court affirmed that under Washington law, coverage which “indemnif[ies] an insured for covered claims which others [third-party claimants] file against him is third-party coverage.  As discussed in Cox, the IFCA defines ‘first party claimant’ in a narrow way that applies only to first-party insurance.”

Filed under Bad Faith, Commercial General Liability, First Party Policy, Unfair Insurance Practices

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds that Statutory Insurance Bad Faith Claims Are Assignable

By on December 17, 2014
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Deciding a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court ruled on December 15, 2014 that insurance bad faith claims arising under 42 Pa. C. S. § 8371 (1990) are freely assignable.

In Allstate Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, No. 39 MAP 2014, Allstate was alleged to have acted in bad faith when an insured motorist suffered a $50,000 punitive damages award after Allstate failed to settle the claim within policy limits. After Allstate refused to pay the punitive damages award, the insured assigned its putative insurance bad faith claim to the tort victim/judgment creditor in exchange for a covenant not to execute against the insured motorist. Allstate argued that statutory bad faith claims are unliquidated personal tort claims that are unassignable under Pennsylvania law as a matter of public policy. The district court disagreed, relying on a line of state Superior Court and federal district court cases holding that such claims were assignable. On appeal, the Third Circuit certified the question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

While the Court recited the competing public policy arguments advanced by the parties and their amici, the Court ultimately treated the case as involving an issue of statutory interpretation. The Court noted that, prior to the enactment of Section 8371, Pennsylvania’s courts had viewed claims of insurance “bad faith” through the lens of contractual claims, which historically were freely assignable. From that, the Court concluded that in enacting the statute, which provided additional remedies of punitive damages, attorneys’ fee-shifting, and presumptively-enhanced prejudgment interest, the legislature intended to supplement the pre-existing contract-based claims, not transform them into non-assignable tort claims.

Centrally, we simply do not believe the General Assembly contemplated that the supplementation of the redress available for bad faith on the part of insurance carriers in relation to their insureds would result either in a curtailment of assignments of pre-existing causes of action in connection with settlements or the splitting of actions. . . . Our fundamental conclusion here is, simply, that we discern no legislative intent to preclude assignability of damages claims under Section 8371 to the degree these have been reposited into a pre-existing liability scheme which permits assignments.

Chief Justice Castille dissented without opinion from the Court’s 5-1 decision.

Filed under Bad Faith

Florida District Court Finds That Settlement Can Trigger Bad-Faith Claim

By and on November 11, 2014
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Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently ruled that an insured need only establish an insurer’s coverage obligation and the extent of damages, and not the insurer’s liability for breach of contract, to be permitted to proceed with a bad-faith claim under Section 624.155(1)(b)1 of the Florida Statutes.

INS BLOG_hurricaneIn Cammarata v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 2014 Fla. App. Lexis 13672 (September 3, 2014), the insureds (homeowners) were two of many South Florida residents who sustained damages as a result of Hurricane Wilma, which hit the coast on October 24, 2005.  Nearly two years later, the insureds filed a claim with their homeowners’ insurer.  The insurer inspected the home and, having estimated the amount of damages to be lower than the policy deductible, advised that the policy had not been triggered.  The parties then participated in an appraisal process, with the insureds’ appraiser submitting an estimate higher than the policy deductible and the insurer’s appraiser submitting an estimate lower than the policy deductible. Pursuant to the policy, the insureds filed a petition requesting that the circuit court appoint a neutral umpire.  The umpire issued an estimate higher than the policy deductible (although lower than the insureds’ appraiser’s estimate), and the insurer paid the amount, minus the deductible.  The insureds then filed a bad-faith action against the insurer under Section 624.155(1)(b)1 of the Florida Statutes.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  In its motion, the insurer argued that because its liability for breach of contract had not been determined the insureds’ bad-faith action was not ripe.  In response, the insureds argued that only an insurer’s liability for coverage and the extent of the damages covered must be determined for a bad-faith claim to mature.  The trial court granted the insurer’s motion.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the determination of the existence of liability and the extent of an insured’s damages are the conditions precedent to a bad-faith action, and that those conditions may be established by a settlement paid by the insurer.  In so holding, the Fourth District receded from its prior decision in Lime Bay Condominium, Inc. v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 94 So.3d 698 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), relied upon by the insurer, in which the Fourth District held that an insurer’s liability for breach of contract must be determined before a bad-faith action becomes ripe, harmonizing that decision with its decision in Trafalgar at Greenacres, Ltd. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 100 So.3d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), in which the Fourth District ruled that an appraisal award issued after an insured filed a breach of contact claim satisfied the necessary prerequisite of obtaining a “favorable resolution” prior to filing a bad-faith claim.

In Cammarata, the Fourth District relied upon the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions in: 1) Blanchard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 575 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1991), addressing an insurer’s claim that an insured must bring a bad-faith claim together with an underlying breach of contract claim, in which the court held that “[a]bsent a determination of the existence of liability . . . and the extent of the [insured’s] damages, a cause of action cannot exist for bad faith”; and 2) Vest v. Travelers Insurance Co., 753 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 2000), addressing a claim for bad faith based upon an insurer’s payment of policy limits after the filing of a bad-faith action, in which the court held that the existence of liability and the extent of an insured’s damages can be established based “upon a settlement,” thereby ripening a bad-faith claim.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the insureds’ bad-faith action, noting that it was not taking any position on whether that action has any merit.

Image courtesy of Flickr by NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.

Filed under Appraisal, Bad Faith

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